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  1. Strypey (strypey@mastodon.nzoss.nz)'s status on Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:12:01 EST Strypey Strypey

    This "security guide" is mind-boggling. Use #iThings instead of an #Android/Linux device (ideally with a custom ROM), and even instead of a laptop?!? Use #Chrome (not Chromium, *Chrome*) and a #Chromebook?!? #WTF
    https://techsolidarity.org/resources/basic_security.htm

    In conversation Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:12:01 EST from mastodon.nzoss.nz permalink
    1. Strypey (strypey@mastodon.nzoss.nz)'s status on Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:17:39 EST Strypey Strypey
      in reply to

      Use #Signal? Despite the fact that there any *many* good reasons for anyone with important secrets to protect
      *not* to do that (US-based, no warrant canary etc), and Moxie has defended aspects of his centralized set-up by saying people shouldn't use it for that?

      In conversation Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:17:39 EST from mastodon.nzoss.nz permalink
      1. Strypey (strypey@mastodon.nzoss.nz)'s status on Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:18:23 EST Strypey Strypey
        in reply to

        BTW I was linked to that guide from @nolan 's blog piece on using a #YubiKey, which is well worth the read:
        https://nolanlawson.com/2018/09/15/yubikeys-are-neat/

        In conversation Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 01:18:23 EST from mastodon.nzoss.nz permalink

        Attachments

        1. YubiKeys are neat
          By Nolan Lawson from Read the Tea Leaves

          I recently picked up a YubiKey, because we use them at work and I was impressed with how simple and easy-to-use they are. I’ve been really happy with it so far – enough to write a blog post about it.

          Basically, YubiKey works like this: whenever you need to do two-factor authentication (2FA), you just plug this little wafer into a USB port and tap a button, and it types out your one-time pass code. Interestingly, it does this by pretending to be a keyboard, which means it doesn’t require any special drivers. (Although it’s funny how Mac pops up a window saying, “Set up your keyboard…”)

          The YubiKey Neo, which is the one I got, also supports NFC, so you can use it on a phone or tablet as well. I’ve only tested it on Android, but apparently iOS has some support too.

          YubiKey is especially nice for sites like Google, GitHub, and Dropbox, because it runs directly in the browser using the FIDO U2F standard. Currently this is only supported in Chrome, but in Firefox you can also set security.webauth.u2f to true in about:config and it works just fine. (I use Firefox as my main browser, so I can confirm that this works across a variety of websites.)

          One thing that pleasantly surprised me about YubiKey is that you can even use it for websites that don’t support U2F devices. Just download the Yubico Authenticator app, plug in your YubiKey, and now your YubiKey is an OTP app, i.e. a replacement for Google Authenticator, Authy, FreeOTP, etc. (Note that Yubico Authenticator doesn’t seem to support iOS, but it runs on desktops and Android, and is even open source on F-Droid.)

          What I like the most about Yubico Authenticator is that it works the same across multiple devices, as long as you’re using the same YubiKey. This is great for me, because I have a weird Android setup, and so I’m frequently factory-resetting my phone, meaning I’d normally have to go through the hassle of setting up all my 2FA accounts again. But with YubiKey, I just have to remember to hold onto this little device that’s smaller than a stick of gum and fits on a keyring.

          One thing I did find a bit annoying, though, is that the NFC communication between my YubiKey and OnePlus 5T is pretty spotty. To get it to work, I have to remove my phone from its case and the YubiKey from my keyring and clumsily mash them together a few times until it finally registers. But it does work.

          Overall though, YubiKey is really cool. Definitely a worthy addition to one’s keyring, and as a bonus it makes me feel like a 21st-century James Bond. (I mean, when I plug it in and it “just works,” not when I’m mashing it into my phone like a monkey.)

          If you’d like to read more about YubiKey and security, you might enjoy this article by Maciej Ceglowski on “basic security precautions for non-profits and journalists in the United States.”

          Update: In addition to U2F, there is also an emerging standard called WebAuthn which is supported in Chrome, Firefox, and Edge without flags and is supported by YubiKey. So far though, website support seems limited, with Dropbox being a major exception.

    2. Bob Jonkman (bobjonkman@gs.jonkman.ca)'s status on Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 20:45:04 EST Bob Jonkman Bob Jonkman
      in reply to
      From that "security" advice: "Use a #Bluetooth keyboard for easier typing" https://hackaday.com/2018/12/30/finding-bugs-in-bluetooth/ Jiska and Dennis pwn all the Bluetooth things.
      In conversation Sunday, 06-Jan-2019 20:45:04 EST from web permalink

      Attachments

      1. 35C3: Finding Bugs in Bluetooth
        By Elliot Williams from Hackaday

        [Jiska Classen] and [Dennis Mantz] created a tool called Internal Blue that aims to be a Swiss-army knife for playing around with Bluetooth at a lower level. The ground for their tool is based in three functions that are common to all Broadcom Bluetooth chipsets: one that lets you read arbitrary memory, on that lets you run it, and one that lets you write it. Well, that was easy. The rest of their work was analyzing this code, and learning how to replace the firmware with their own version. That took them a few months of hard reversing work.

        In the end, Internal Blue lets them execute commands at one layer deeper — the LMP layer — easily allowing monitoring and injection. In a series of live (and successful!) demos they probe around on a Nexus 6P from a modified Nexus 5 on their desk. This is where they started digging around in the Bluetooth stack of other devices with Broadcom chipsets, and that’s where they started finding bugs.

        As is often the case, [Jiska] was just poking around and found an external code handler that didn’t do bounds checking. And that meant that she could run other functions in the firmware simply by passing the address handler offset. Since they’re essentially calling functions at any location in memory, finding which functions to call with which arguments is a process of trial and error, but the ramifications of this include at least a Bluetooth module crash and reset, but can also pull such tricks as putting the Bluetooth module into “Device Under Test” mode, which should only be accessible from the device itself. All of this is before pairing with the device — just walking by is sufficient to invoke functions through the buggy handler.

        All the details of this exploit aren’t yet available, because Broadcom hasn’t fixed the firmware for probably millions of devices in the wild. And one of the reasons that they haven’t fixed it is that patching the bug will disclose where the flaw lies in all of the unpatched phones, and not all vendors can be counted on to push out updates at the same time. While they focused on the Nexus 5 cellphone, which is fairly old now, it’s applicable to any device with a similar Broadcom Bluetooth chipset.

        Aside from the zero-day bug here, the big story is their Bluetooth analysis framework which will surely help other researchers learn more about Bluetooth, finding more glitches and hopefully helping make Bluetooth more openly scrutinized and more secure. Now anyone with a Raspberry Pi 3/3+ or a Nexus 5, is able to turn it into a low-level Bluetooth investigation tool.

        You might know [Jiska] from her previous FitBit hack. If not, be sure to check it out.

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