Notices by Stéphane Bortzmeyer (bortzmeyer@mastodon.gougere.fr), page 24

@sb_51_ Plusieurs articles. Par exemple https://twitter.com/carmelatroncoso/status/1153628475619794944

Now, technical plenary at #IETF105, on #privacy. Live at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VT4-xIZ-tNs

Arvind Narayanan and Steve Bellovin on stage.

Ted Hardie introducing Bellovin: "He was on Usenet. You may have heard of that."

Narayanan talks (very fast) about privacy measurements.

@bakaniko Et Thalès, alors ?

Currently listening to astronauts speaking from the moon. #IETF105 #Meetecho #garbled #remotePresentation #understandNothing

@mmu_man @R1Rail @cstrotm nicinfo is written in #Ruby.

#exotic

Some slides titles at #IETF105 are surprising:

"Privacy-conscious monitoring"

@R1Rail @cstrotm Low level?

% curl -s http://rdap.db.ripe.net/ip/31.133.136.194 | jq .country
"CH"

@R1Rail @cstrotm curl and jq are certainly available on Debian testing :-}

@cstrotm "will replace". Well, may be, but whois already killed several contenders...

Les exposés de chercheurs détaillant comment ils ont contourné le #chiffrement et découvert ce qu'il y a en dessous, c'est déprimant. #IETF105 #viePrivée #onVaTousMourir #tousÀPoil

Performances of #DoH (#DNS over HTTPS) and #DoT (DNS over TLS). Does it have consequences on user experience?

DoH (and DoT) can be, in some cases, *faster* than traditional DNS, thanks to the use of TCP.

#ANRW19 #IETF105

@tcit Yes, partially https://www.githubstatus.com/

Oblivious DNS, a protocol for protecting privacy on the #DNS

Existing privacy techniques do not protect against the resolver. The resolver stills sees everything.

Solution: encrypted DNS-over-DNS tunnel between the client and the Oblivious DNS server (which pretends to be auth. but is actually the real resolver). It will see the query but not the user, and the default resolver wll see the user but not the query.

Implemented in Go. Good performances.

#ANRW19 #IETF105

7 % AS do it world-wide (17 % in China). So, it is common. Funnily, very often, responses are NOT tampered with.

Solutions: #DNSSEC validation on the client, encrypted DNS

#DNS #ANRW19 #IETF105

#DNS interception: who is answering my queries?

Internet access providers, governments, antivirus software and of course malware intercept DNS requests and send false replies.

How to measure its prevalence? Check at the auth. server if there is a request and where does it come from. Careful: interception policy may depend on many things (qtype, TLD in the qname, DNS resolver, etc).

#ANRW19 #IETF105

"We will now see how to convert a password into an elliptic curve point." #cryptography #Dragonfly #ANRW19 #IETF105