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Notices by Alexandre Oliva (moved to @lxo@gnusocial.jp) (lxo@gnusocial.net), page 64
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and if you make false assumptions and then proceed to draw incorrect conclusions from them, whose failing is it?
are you familiar with the notion of the worldwide network of FSFs? FSF India, FSF Europe, FSF Latin America... mentored individuals *and* supported a group of people to the point where they're able to replace you and take things in new positive directions much?
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> practices consisting in shipping binaries (jars) of unknown provenance
this fits in with an article I'm thinking of writing, about various undesirable consequences to software freedom of some recent software packaging trends. thanks for providing me with yet another undesirable consequence to mention
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> All of this dark aura of crime-enabling goes away if I have a data-sharing service where *I* select and curate *exactly what I want to host and nothing else*.
*nod*, that makes it a kind of service that does not preserve privacy. those are fine for publishing stuff, not so much for e.g. cooperating off-site backups
but we are back to your being able to observe what goes through your wires, the bit that was already clear, while I was trying to explore was the exception that made it acceptable, even desirable for a data transport service to not know what it's carrying (because it's encrypted), that I assume might extend to caching and longer-term forms of encrypted data storage. Here, again, you, should you choose to be the provider, would not know what's going through your wire, so you couldn't possibly assess how much of the data is lawful, any more than a Tor relay node operator could. IIUC, you wouldn't want to run these, and I guess you wouldn't want to run an ISP either
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some analysis of consequence of drawing this line as I guessed (correctly or not):
criminals will strive to hide their activities, and thus they will naturally seek privacy-respecting communication services for these activities
noncriminals, in turn, should they decide whether or not to participate using this line, will see the criminals there, that are likely to be early adopters, and steer themselves away from privacy-respecting therefore criminal-infested services, and stick to services that do NOT respect privacy
meanwhile, noncriminals that use a different line, such as the *potential* for lawful uses of privacy-respecting services, might join, and turn the services into ones where the majority of uses are lawful, enabling even people who draw the line as I guessed do
so I guess this line wouldn't prevent its adopters from joining, after all, it just makes them later adopters of privacy-respecting services, provided the services succeed at attracting many lawful adopters first
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> by far a clear majority of legitimate, lawful use cases
aah, that's the line that seems to clear it up for me.
it's not just that there must be lawful uses, it's not that lawful uses might be concocted, it's (I guess) that you must be able to see for yourself that most uses a lawful, and therefore, if everything is encrypted, you can't check, so it's not acceptable for you. (do I guess right? if so, I think I heard a click here ;-)
thanks again
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> how many times
sorry if I wasn't loud and clear myself, but I've got that point already. what I haven't quite got is the exception:
> If I was *selling* access to the network to others, that might be different
I don't see why being paid would make it acceptable to host or route child porn, or to be a drug mule for that matter.
what makes it hard for me to grasp it is that, in some of the services we're talking about, people are not paid to offer them, while in others, people get similar service in return, which may count as payback, but none of this seems to matter. while in other cases, as you mentioned, selling them seems to be a key element in making it acceptable. I'm sure that makes sense to you, and I look forward to grasping that reasoning myself, and I hope you're still willing to explore and expose it further. regardless, I thank you for your help so far
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> It must be the users' choice as to what data goes on it.
right, but that doesn't seem to apply to our ISPs, not because they must be allowed to chose what data goes through their wires, but because they have common carrier status, which has nothing whatsoever to do with any moral objections they might have.
so if we our own computers play the role of routers, caches, or otherwise storage for others, and if we had similar immunity to that given to common carriers, would that be enough to alleviate your concerns about hosting or routing data for others?
I expect that, if the data is encrypted so that you can't possibly have a clue as to what it is, it would be pretty hard to hold you criminally liable for it. nearly all criminal law requires intent, which would be challenging to establish if neither you nor anyone else can tell what's in there. it's like carrying a bunch of harmless subatomic particles, that only a machine someone else has can rearrange into (il?)legal matter
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erhm, I thought I understood your stance as a moral one, rather than a liability-averting one, but your response about "common carrier" status seems to point the opposite direction. surely being labeled, or regarding oneself as a common carrier, vs a common mule, doesn't address any of the moral issues that you appeared to be more concerned about. I guess it's a combination of both moral and legal, after all?
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thanks for the info. I don't know about any of these IRC-related facts. I suppose they might be in the court case, but I can't grasp Swedish, and I haven't seen (or don't recall) reports about that in languages I can
anyway, I think we've established that "no political prisoners" is unfortunately not something that Sweden can pride itself in. sucks to live in a world where irresistible imperial forces can force the hands of otherwise good-willing peoples :-(
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I get what you're saying. it still doesn't fit the facts.
rms has been under attack by the same groups, for the same reasons, for as long as I can remember. it's nothing like "it's now time for him to make way for them". that would amount to calling defeat. the movement he's devoted his life to build would then go down the same path of occupation and corruption by corporations that pretty much every other organization in the community has taken.
if he's to make way to someone else, it ought to be someone, or some group, at least as radical as he has been on the core values of the movement. if he (and I) are getting in the way of something, it's of watering the movement down
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would you believe if he seemed overwhelmed by emotions when getting the award?
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no les captures, déjalos libres, como les gusta :-)
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I don't like that recaps run before the end of the period they refer to. like, 2021 recap in mid december, how about things that happen in the last two weeks? they won't belong in the 2022 recap, and it's too late for them to be in the 2021 recap.
I favor moving recaps a little into the next year!
:-) / 2
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but you don't stand out the way an average would!
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@ninapaley you're a genius!
/me bows in awe
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honest question: have such secure enclaves ever been used for anything but granting remote parties power over the user supposed to own the device, so that they can command the device to betray the user in ways that cannot be appealed or worked around?
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.oO essa é a deixa pro TSE negar invasão e nos assegurar, sem checagem, da integridade do software das urnas e da apuração
https://gnusocial.net/url/7592617
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#GNU #Linux-libre 5.15.8-gnu, 5.10.85-gnu1, 5.4.165-gnu1, 4.19.221-gnu1, 4.14.258-gnu1, 4.9.293-gnu1, and 4.4.295-gnu1 sources, tarballs and patches, and #Freesh and #RPMFreedom binaries are available
#Freed-ora 5.15.7-gnu rpms are now stable updates
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the framing as "mules" does get the feeling across loud and clear :-) I get the concerns about hosting intolerable stuff
however, I was here thinking "I'm glad my ISP doesn't block encrypted data I transfer through their wire, on the grounds that it might contain bits they can't see, but that they might prefer not to carry" it's a similar conundrum, and I'm pretty sure that allowing ISPs to decrypt everything so as to be able to curate what they're willing to transfer is not the right solution
running a Tor node (bridge, relay, exit, whatever) has made me think a lot about this. I assume there is weird shit flowing in there that I wouldn't want to touch with a 10ft pole, but helping those who live under censorship get information in and out, and helping maintain infrastructure for free communication also makes room for abuse. I rationalize it with presumption of innocence, and hope that the good makes up for the bad, but that's just me. I doubt there's a one-size-fits-all
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thanks for sharing your perspectives, it's appreciated. I perceive it a quite challenging, but I'll look into integrating these concerns into the (so far vaporware) P2P redundant storage layer I propose for the software architecture at https://www.fsfla.org/blogs/lxo/draft/decent-computing
I realize the SSB-given context may have influenced your perspective, so, in case you're interested enough to have a look at the proposal and adjust your position, and offer suggestions, I thank you in advance for it ;-)
I also see potential for P2P off-site backups, and I hoped encryption and data fragmentation could relieve someone from responsibility over what one doesn't even know to be hosting for the other, but allowing someone to *know*, so as to possibly reject, what they might otherwise hosting for others poses quite a challenge. my first reaction is that such a system wouldn't be suitable for you either, and I don't see how to improve it so that it could be
Alexandre Oliva (moved to @lxo@gnusocial.jp)
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