Notices by jim (jim@campaign.openworlds.info), page 7

@Horst @openrightsgroup

It must place some restrictions on Google of course.

My feeling is that analytics can and will be a lot more intrusive than can be dealt with through user self-protection—plus people should not have to rely on that.

So we may need law and contract to impose some limits to what other actors, including advertisers and GCHQ, may legitimately do with public data.

@Horst @openrightsgroup

Email is a good parallel; the two things that flow from it are that

(a) micro-blogging can be different given that it is inherently public

(b) both email and decentralised micro-blogging have the same intrinsic privacy issues; if I am worried about gmail and use email, then I am left with little choice about Google getting my email details in practice.

@strypey @bobjonkman Not really. Every election system is different; the hardware and software requirements are different. The security issues can be per-implementation.

We aren't going to agree on this I’m afraid. I will watch the video discussed before and I am happy to look at anything substantive but we will soon end up boring or annoying each other if we carry on picking potential holes in our respective stances.

@strypey @bobjonkman Well, there are many factors involved, but one key point is that nobody wants to pay for elections. In the UK for instance they are run on a tiny budget. They are also used occasionally, and this makes security even harder than normal.

As I say what you seem to be after (really) is direct democracy. That comes in many forms. While online voting might enable it, there are other ways to do. It's also a huge change for most countries, which would need a culture shift.

@strypey @bobjonkman

Nevertheless, state elections are precisely where e-voting trials / rollout does take place, and the software is not just closed, but basically commodity product built on Windows.

Prizes would need to be for proof of attack. I can claim one for leaning over your shoulder as you vote.

@bobjonkman I'll make the time to listen (not right now).

The practice vs theory is a big issue of course, but I'm struggling to see how online voting can be secret. I'll get back when I've found time to go through it.

@bobjonkman @strypey

The issues are not whether encryption can solve the anonymity problem, but whether

(a) there is a secret ballot (social problem with online voting)

(b) the software and hardware are invulnerable to tampering

(c) the population at large are inclined to believe experts saying it is all safe

As to whether paper and pens are the only solution: currently I would they are the *best* solution for *state-run elections*.

@strypey The USA right now is debating making paper trails a requirement for all electronic elections, on the grounds of security,

If they succeed, then online voting will be hard in the US context. Yet the USA does a lot of the referenda you talk about. Which was the driver for voting booth machines in the first place.

So various things may be possible, but in summary online voting seems especially hard to do safely.

@strypey I don't see how you arrive at that conclusion. Surely it depends on the nature of the vote? If the referendum is for a community centre to be built, or a massive bridge, then certain actors have definite reasons to manipulate the outcome.

@strypey On the local election fraud, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32428648 for instance.

Postal ballots are also open to small scale intimidation, from family members etc.

Postal and online voting are not secret ballots. This is a problem.

@strypey I would tackle that at the other end: finding ways to create participatory democracy from the ground up. Including through local government.

Open code does not eliminate the whole set of verification issues, at each level.

Yes some elections are more worth hacking than others. But any vuln anywhere calls any election into doubt. CF Netherlands evoting machines being withdrawn for local elections.

@strypey @Hamishcampbell @doryandgeoff I'm not sure that is an answer.

In the US, the (successful) attempts to hack electronic voting systems were clearly to design to throw doubt on the result – which they did, even though it also turned out that votes had not been tampered with.

@strypey @Hamishcampbell @doryandgeoff On the social confusion issue, think how this Russian “hack” of US voting systems was intended to play out: http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/highland-park/news/ct-hpn-election-integrity-forum-tl-1102-20171031-story.html

@ColinTheMathmo @UberGeek @ambassador

I don't think small instances are a *problem* but that isn't the same as whether it is *attractive* or easy to tell for an end user.

Migration does solve most of the trust issues I agree. It can't solve the issue of quick / instant server death.

There is a herd element to human trust judgements. If people like me are doing this then it must be ok because I trust their opinions.

Maintenance may be more likely to be an issue on smaller instances.