@z428 secondly, a federation of servers can be imagined as a single server made up of many parts, each of which has to communicate with every other part for the system to work as advertised. Instead of the server being a black box (like Signal), where you just have to trust what happens between client>server, in a federation you can check exactly what's being passed between servers, and how secure it is. Lots of people can check, and check each others' work. @gentoorebel
@z428 there are at least three things to consider 1) is it possible to audit the security, 2) has the security been audited, 3) did the auditors do a thorough job? In order to meet the preconditions for 1), you need a) access to the source code, and b) a way to ensure that the source code you're given was actually used to compile the binaries/ installed on the server. Signal now meets a) but goes to great lengths to avoid b), which is ... fishy. @gentoorebel
@1iceloops123 that would require #GNUsocial to finish rolling out their AP support (AFAIK that hasn't dropped yet), and #Tusky and #Mastolab to implement to server>client part of the AP spec as well as the bespoke Masto/Pleroma API. @alice@lain
@lain just to be clear, so I don't get told off for spreading FUD, the AP spec has no language that specifies how to exchange private messages between servers? If AppX follows the AP spec without using Masto or Pleroma as a reference implementation, they won't end up with DMs? @alice
@dgold Moxie says *both* that people should use it for critical stuff, and then when challenged on all the reasons that's a bad idea, changes tack and says they *shouldn't*. Also that's not what I said. I'm talking about RiseUp providing advice on how to use their services in ways that give them less access to your data (eg using PGP with email, not storing mail on server etc) @dgold
@leip4Ier the #Telegram server is not free code. So users have no way to verify what happens to their messages when they hit the servers, and what it's doing. In that respect Telegram is evens worse than Signal, which at least releases source code that they claim is what they use on their servers. @gentoorebel@noorul
@kawaiipunk if your target is high user numbers, not secure chat, then going for vanilla mobiles makes total sense. But most current mobile devices are inherently pwned by the OS vendors, device manufacturers, and others, in ways that we've spent 20 years figuring out how to hack around on the desktop platform with things like #Tails/ #Heads. @bob@gentoorebel@noorul
@noorul secure against what? What kind of app security you need depends on your #ThreatModel. But if you're trying to do security of any serious kind, not allowing people to use your app on GNU/Linux without also using an iOS or Android device just seem amateur. As does tying your chat ID to your phone number, which makes it much easier to tie metadata to real humans.
@colomar you're missing the point. There's no way to be sure that the content of the communications *are* secret. We just have to trust Moxie and OWS. Which means Signal is fine as a Mom and Pop chat app, but Moxie has specifically claimed it's a "secure" chat app for
> dissidents, activists, NGOs, and journalists
... from whom the US government is almost always a potential adversary.
@dgold fair call. Although as Drew points out, we have to take Moxie's word for it that this is all Signal stores. There's no way I'm aware of to independently verify that. Now it's true that #RiseUp's warrant canary is only useful to the degree that I trust RiseUp. But I'm more inclined to trust RiseUp because they tell users we shouldn't, and explain to us the things we can do to reduce the degree to which our security depends on trusting them. @kawaiipunk@gentoorebel@noorul
@kawaiipunk I've been thinking about these for years, like #Serval, #GNU#Jami (formerly #Ring), #Tox, and others. But I struggle to find people to test them with, and when a "secure" chat app only has clients for iOS and Android, I struggle to take them seriously. @bob@gentoorebel@noorul
@lain do the DMs between #Mastodon and #Pleroma conform to the AP spec? What I mean is, If AppX implemented the AP spec in full, would users on an instance of AppX be able to send DMs to users on Mastodon and Pleroma instances and vice-versa?
@z428 I also note that this comment includes Moxie claiming that Signal is safe for ...
> all the dissidents, activists, NGOs, and journalists that I've met
This is clearly *not* the case, for reasons Drew describes in his piece, and Moxie himself says elsewhere that such people should *not* expect Signal to keep their comms safe (can't find the quote right now but I'll dig it up if you can't find it for yourself) @gentoorebel@noorul
@z428 there's a lot to unpack in that comment. The dismissal of anyone who thinks #SoftwareFreedom is a necessary precondition for secure software as "cryptonerds and moralists" is notable. Once you strip out all the hyperbole and sarcasm, most of the factual claims are debunked in the proceeding comments, starting with: https://github.com/LibreSignal/LibreSignal/issues/37#issuecomment-217664961
@bhaugen sorry, ambiguous sentence, what I meant was that what @matslats was advocating in his piece turned out (once I read it properly) to be the same thing I was arguing ;-) @Matt_Noyes
@bikecurious The Android device I have is a testing toy I got given, I don't trust it. TBH I don't want to have an Android device at all. I don't consider any of them trustworthy. They are pwned from the day they OS is installed, either by Google, or by the manufacturer, or by the government of the country they are made or sold in. I'm waiting for the #Librem5 to be released. @gentoorebel@noorul@fdroidorg
@bikecurious fascinating. I wonder if it will ever come to a trademark standoff? Guess who will win (clue: the developer with the biggest bevy of lawyers). @gentoorebel@noorul